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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78A-3-102(3)G). This case has been transferred to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4-
103(2)G) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
a. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
Fraud claim against the real estate broker based on an agreement dated August 18, 2008 
containing a broker exculpatory clause, and the agreement was signed only after all 
broker services were rendered. 
Preserved: Appeal from Minute Entry dated October 31, 2012, (Rec. 323) 
Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
granted is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d 
570, 572 (Utah 2013) 
b. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Appellants' claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty against the real estate broker because 
Appellants did not have an expert witness, even though the breach resulted from 
fraudulent behavior of the broker, and the issues regarding fraud, misrepresentation and 
nondisclosure are issues a jury easily understands? 
Preserved: Appeal from Order on Defendants Coldwell Banker Commercial and 
Duane Bush's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 21, 2104, (Rec. 1363) 
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Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
granted is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d 
570, 572, fn 2 (Utah 2013) 
c. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
accountant pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 58-26a-602 and against Appellants, dismissing 
their negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty claims when the accountant 
was paid to provide attestation services directly to Appellants in a due diligence meeting 
prior to purchasing the company they were investigating, when the only purpose of the 
meeting was to benefit Appellants, and when the same created an accountant-client 
relationship with Appellants? 
Preserved: Appeal from Findings and Order on Defendant Child Van Wagoner & 
Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 21, 
2014. (Rec. 1368) 
Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
granted is a _question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d 
570, 572, fn 2 (Utah 2013) 
d. Issue: Whether the meaning of the statute requiring that an accountant or client 
be identified in writing that the professional services performed on behalf of the client 
were intended to be relied upon in order to establish liability, is satisfied by many 
writings, emails and documents from the accountant which relate to the due diligence 
services he is performing to buyers and the specific due diligence meeting of the 
particular buyer. 
5 
Q 
G 
/'..'.\ ~ 
Preserved: Appeal from Findings and Order on Defendant Child Van Wagoner & 
@ Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 21, 
2014. (Rec. 1368) 
Standard of Review: Whether a Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
granted is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 p.3d 
570, 572, fn 2 (Utah 2013). 
e. Issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in disallowing Appellants to have 
Instruction No. CV1811 of the Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, on 
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure read to the jury, because that instruction had 
an element of duty, and the court had earlier dismissed a negligence action which had a 
duty element. 
Preserved: Oral ruling by Trial Court at Trial Disallowing Jury Instruction on 
February 20, 2014 (Rec. 1828 p. 11-12) 
Standard of Review: The element of duty in connection with Fraudulent 
Nondisclosure is an issue oflaw. Yazd v. Woodside, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006). 
Questions of law are reviewed on appeal for correctness. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 
P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002). 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the lower court's final judgment after a verdict in favor 
ofDefendants-Appellees Child Van Wagoner & Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw after 
a trial on their fraud claim. The trial court had earlier granted summary judgment in favor 
of Bradshaws on their Motion to Dismiss the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims, which has been appealed. The Court also disallowed a jury instruction from the 
Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition concerning concealment or fraudulent 
nondisclosure which has been appealed. 
This appeal is also taken from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Coldwell 
Banker Commercial and Duane Bush dismissing Appellants' fraud claim against them. 
Summary Judgment was also granted in favor of Coldwell Banker and Bush dismissing 
Appellant's breach of fiduciary claim against them, which is appealed. 
7 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July, 2008, David Ball and Brad Ball, individually and as President 
for Reperex, Inc. (hereafter collectively "Balls") were looking to acquire a new business 
and contacted Coldwell Banker Commercial (CBC) and its agent, Mr. Duane Bush. (Rec. 
2) 
2. CBC through its agent Bush introduced Plaintiffs-Appellants David Ball and 
Brad Ball (the Balls) to a business for s~le called May's Custom Tile owned by Steve 
May as a prospective business for sale. (Rec. 2) After several meetings and a due 
diligence meeting on August 11, 2008, The Balls offered to purchase the business. (Rec. 
2) 
3. Bush has been a real estate agent for 12 years at the time of his 2010 deposition, 
and prior to his being a real estate agent, Bush owned and managed two businesses during 
the period between 1983 to 2001, wherein he gained experience regarding what is 
relevant in the purchase and sale of a business. (Rec. 1223-1224) 
4. At the time in which The Balls contacted CBC and Duane Bush to show them 
business properties, Duane Bush represented to David Ball and Brad Ball in his office at 
CBC that he was a real estate agent acting for Coldwell Banker as his broker. (Rec. 205-
208) 
5. On July 18, 2008, Duane Bush represented to both David Ball and Brad Ball 
that he was acting as a fiduciary to both the Sellers and the Buyers in a dual agency 
capacity in the subject transaction. (Rec. 1259, 1261) 
6. Duane Bush himself plainly admitted in his sworn deposition dated October 14, 
2010 two different times that he had a fiduciary duty to both the Seller and the Buyer. 
See Deposition of Duane Bush, (Rec. 204, 1225) 
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7. Duane Bush received from May's accountant Bradshaw an email on March 27, 
2008 with a 2006 profit and loss statement made the same date and time, for May's 
Custom Tile showing that the company made $74,000 in profits in 2006, and wherein 
Bradshaw stated to Bush in the email that the 2006 books were "a bit shakey." (Rec. 
1228-1233) 
8. Bush concealed this statement to the Balls, and he also concealed the email he 
received from the Company accountant that the books were "a bit shakey." (Rec. 1199, 
par 36) 
9. Bush made false fraudulent adjustments to the numbers supplied by Bradshaw 
in order to misrepresent the profits shown by Bradshaw to be much higher. Rec. 1235-
1239) 
10. Bush then drafted falsified profit and loss statements showing the 2006 profits 
to be $371,742.00 and higher, which were the only profit and loss statement which Bush 
showed the Balls purporting to come from Steve May. (Rec. 1240, 1260 par 4, 1262 par 
4) 
11. The Balls also requested Bush to tell them what was the Utah licensing 
requirements in order to run the business they were purchasing, whereupon Bush 
represented that they did not have to worry about any issue with a state license, and that 
Mr. May would assist them until they got it. (Rec. 1260 par 5, 1262 par 5) 
12. Bush knowingly and recklessly represented to the Balls that the Balls could 
get a contractor's license in 90 days, while he knew or recklessly should have known that 
it actually took 3 years to get a contractor's license in this line of work. (Rec. 207 par 13-
14, 210 par 13-14) 
9 
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13. Bush also represented to the Balls that Promontory, a real estate developer, 
~ was a large account of the Tile company, which provided 40% of the business to the 
company in 2007 and in 2008. (Rec. 1260 par 6, 1261 par 6) 
14. Bush represented to the Balls that all accounts including Promontory would 
continue to make the company prosperous in the future as it had hitherto been. (Rec. · 
1246) 
15. In fact Bush knew on April 3, 2008 that Promontory had gone bankrupt as he 
acknowledged in an email of the same date, and that there would be no new business 
coming from it to the business, which resulted in a 40% decline in business to the Tile 
company at the time Promontory filed for bankruptcy. (Rec. 1258) 
16. Bush never showed the Balls the email he sent on April 3, 2008 indicating that 
Promontory was in bankruptcy and that he knew that it was in bankruptcy. (Rec. 1260, 
par 6) 
17. David Ball specifically asked Bush about a vital concern he had regarding 
whether there was any commingling between May's Custom Tile company and May's 
Granite company, both companies of which were owned by Steve May. (Rec. 1260, par 
7, 1262, par 7) 
18. Mr. Bush made it crystal clear that there could not be any commingling 
between the company; otherwise Coldwell Banker absolutely could not market the 
business in any degree .. (Rec. 1260, par 7, 1262, par 7) 
19. In fact, May's accountant Bradshaw told Bush in his March 27, 2008 email, 
"Keep in mind that there was a lot of intercompany commingling between Mays Tile and 
Mays Granite." (Rec. 1228) 
~ 20. Bush concealed from the Balls this email where the accountant admitted that 
there was "a lot of intercompany commingling." (Rec. 1260 par 7, 1262 par 7) 
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21 On August 18, 2008, The Balls closed the transaction to purchase May's Tile 
from Steve May wherein they signed an Agreement for Sale of Assets (hereafter 
"Agreement"). (Rec. 148-183) 
22 In addition to the agreement and other closing documents was a document 
entitled Broker Acknowledgment which was an agreement between the Balls and CBC. 
(Rec. 182-183) 
23. All of the services of Bush and CBC had been performed at the time of closing 
on August 18, 2008, and all of the due diligence by The Balls had already taken place by 
such closing date. (Rec. 206 par 5-7, 209 par 5-7) 
24. During all of the time from the first encounter between the Balls and CBC 
during the due diligence and prior to closing, Balls were never told anything about any 
document which would limit the liability of either Bush or CBC. See Affidavits of David 
Ball and Brad Ball. (Rec. 206 par 6, 209 par 6) 
25. The Broker Acknowledgment had the following provision: 
Buyer hereby acknowledges that Buyer is relying on its own inspection of 
the involved business and the representations of the Seller and not of 
COLDWELL BANKER COMMERCIAL and/or any of its agents or 
employees with regards to the prior operating history of the business, the 
value of the assets being purchased and all other material facts of Seller in 
completing the transaction as evidenced by the Agreement for Purchase and 
Sale together with its attachments. (Rec. 182) 
26. The Broker Acknowledgment went on to say: 
"Buyer further acknowledges that neither COLDWELL BANKER 
COMMERCIAL nor any of its agents and/or employees have verified the 
representations of the Seller, and should any representations be untrue, 
Buyer agrees to look solely to Seller for relief and to indemnify 
COLDWELL BANKER COMMERCIAL, its agents and employees and 
hold them harmless in connection with all losses and damages caused to 
Buyer thereby." (Rec. 182) 
27. The Balls understood the Broker Acknowledgment to mean that the Broker 
made no verification of the information which Sellers, Bush and CBC had represented to 
11 
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them, and since they made no verification, Bush and CBC therefore had no information to 
(.$) either corroborate or deny the representations which Seller, Bush and CBC made to The 
Balls. See Affidavits of David Ball and Brad Ball. (Rec. 206 par 9, 209 par 9) 
28. The Balls had no understanding nor reason to understand that Bush and CBC 
in fact did verify information which Bush and CBC misrepresented to them, and that their 
representations were verified by Bush and CBC to be false. (Rec. 206 par 9-12, 209 par 
9-12) 
29. Bush and CBC all purposely withheld and concealed information they knew 
would show the falsity of their representations during the entire due diligence of the of 
the company by the Balls. (Rec. 206 par 9-16, 209 par 9-17) 
30. Balls would not have signed the Broker Acknowledgment document had they 
known that Bush and CBC had obtained verification and had full knowledge that the 
@ representations made by themselves and sellers were false. See Affidavits of David Ball 
. and Brad Ball. (Rec. 206 par 14, 209 par 15) 
31. CBC and Bush moved for judgment on the pleadings on Balls' claim for fraud 
against Bush and CBC based on the exculpatory agreement, and also on Balls' claim 
against Bush and CBC for breach of fiduciary duty. (Rec. 131) 
32. The Trial Court dismissed the Balls' fraud claim and let stand Balls' Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty claim after a hearing on September 18, 2012 and in a written ruling dated 
October 31, 2012. (Rec. 323-324) 
33. CBC and Bush later moved for Summary Judgment after discovery on The 
Balls' Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim alleging that the Balls could not prove a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim without an expert witness, notwithstanding the Balls' argument and 
~ evidence that Bush's intentional and reckless false representations, being a breach of 
fiduciary duty, was well within the purview of the understanding of a jury. (Rec. 957) 
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34. The Court, granted CBC and Bush's Motion for Summary Judgment after a 
hearing on March 19, 2014. (Rec. 1363) 
3 5. The ruling granting CBC and Bush Summary Judgment indicated that since 
the sale of the business was of a complex nature, the Balls needed an expert witness to 
show negligence wherein the broker fell below a duty of reasonable care, but the oral 
ruling and written order inexplicably mentioned nothing regarding the intentional, 
reckless false representations and negligent fraud which was well within the 
understanding of any jury and which also constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. (Rec. 
1364, 1824 p 68) 
36. Defendants Child Van Wagoner & Bradshaw, an accounting firm, and Russ 
Bradshaw, one of the firm's partner accountants, (collectively hereinafter Bradshaws) 
were hired on a contract basis by Steve May to prepare tax returns and also to provide a 
variety of consulting and accounting consulting services for Mays Custom Tile and May's 
Granite. (Rec. 1045 par 4, 1138 par 31-35) 
3 7. May's Tile and Granite companies had an in-house bookkeeper which 
maintained daily sales and bank deposit entries; however, all of the accounting journal 
entry financial transactions were made by Bradshaws and were marked "RUSS". 
Bradshaws also kept many file notes on the books. (Rec. I 138 par 35, 1148-1150, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 51, 59, 67) 
38. Periodically, Mays would provide its Quickbooks files to Bradshaw who 
would use the files presented to prepare Mays' tax returns, and also to provide accounting 
services therewith. (Rec. 1045 par. IO) 
39. When May put May's Custom Tile on the market to sell, he hired Bradshaw to 
provide consulting services to Bush and to further provide attestation services and to 
answer questions to prospective buyers of the company, including Mark Cobb, a previous 
13 
prospect, and also to the Balls. These consulting services was manifest in numerous 
~ emails to and from Bradshaw. (Rec. 1118-1138, 1195 par 7-10, 13-14) 
40. Bradshaw admits in deposition that the advice to Bush's second prospect, now 
the Balls, was ongoing, where he said, "I was asked to provide similar documents to -- to 
Duane Bush as we had before. Many of them were the same documents. Nothing 
changed." (Rec. 1170, lines 7-20) 
41. Bradshaw was hired to provide attestation services to the Balls, which 
included preparing the books for the due diligence review and sending Eric Dow of his 
office staff to Mr. May's office to update the books by making accounting journal entries 
3 business days before a due diligence meeting to be held on August 11, 2008, and 
conducting attestation services at that due diligence hearing. (Rec. 1135, par 7-28, 1202, 
par. 8-29, 1141 p. 38 line 10 thru p. 40 line 11, 1144.p. 8 line 10 thru p. 11 line 23) 
42. Bradshaw was further hired to prepare the 2007 tax returns and make journal 
entries in the books in such a way as to knowingly conceal the misrepresentation to 
buyers of the company of the purported 2006 cash basis profits of$310,000.00 on the tax 
return when the 2006 profits were actually $74,000.00. (Rec. 1160-1161, Int. 9) 
43. The 2007 tax returns of the Tile and the Granite companies were also prepared 
by Bradshaw in such a way as to commingle the Tile and Granite books so as to 
knowingly conceal the fact that the 2007 Tile profits to be positive $276,000 and the 
Granite profits to be Negative $273,442.00. (Rec. 1118, 1199 par 37-40, Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 4 7, 50, 51) 
44. The 2007 Tile tax returns were also prepared early to satisfy a request of a 
buyer of the company, Mark Cobb. (Rec. 1120) 
45. Bradshaws also prepared the 2008 tax return in such a way as to conceal their 
misrepresentations to the Balls that the 2006 cash basis profits of the company were much 
14 
higher than they actually were. (Rec. 1153-1154, 1196 par 14-15 & 31-36, 1160-1161, 
Int. 9, 1155) 
46. The Balls, the Seller May and Bradshaws all agreed that Bradshaws would 
directly provide attestation and verification services to the Balls in the Balls' August 11 
Due Diligence Meeting to purchase the company, and that the Balls were Bradshaws' 
client for those services, for which May paid Bradshaw in the Balis' behalf pursuant to 
Bradshaws' billing to May. Bradshaw did provide the Attestation services (Rec. 1128, 
1827 at page 79, lines 16-20, 1195 par 8-28, 1196, par 8-28, 1141 p. 38 line 10 thru p. 40 
line 11) 
4 7. Bradshaws knew that the meeting was a due diligence meeting for the The 
Balls before they bought the company and that he was hired to perform the attestation and 
verification services directly to the Balls. (Rec. 1827 at page 79, lines 16-20) 
48. There was no other purpose of the meeting than for Bradshaw to provide the 
due diligence services to the Balls to which all parties agreed. The Balls had no other 
way of verifying the records of the company than by their due diligence at that due 
diligence meeting. (Rec. 1195 par 8-28) 
49. Bradshaws also invoiced The Balls directly for the services he rendered in 
preparing for and attending the deposition of Plaintiffs, and for responding to Plaintiffs' 
subpoenas. (Rec. 1163-1164) 
50. At that due diligence meeting, Bradshaw provided due diligence services, and 
produced reports to the Balls from his own computer at his office. (Rec. 1046 par. 13) 
51. At the due diligence meeting, Bradshaws provided the 2006 tax return, the 
2007 tax return which they prepared, to Bush, and to the Balls. Bradshaws also provided 
accounting reports specifically to validate the veracity of the 2006 and the 2007 tax 
returns and income. (Rec. 1196 par 17-18, 1203 par. 17-18) 
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52. Bradshaws also s~owed the Balls a sales report for the Tile company for the 
(0 months of January through July, 2008 in addition to showing other information and 
answering questions which the Balls asked. (Rec. 1197 par 21, 24, 1204 par 21, 24) 
53~ Bradshaw further demonstrated that he knew that the $600,000.00 sales for the 
first half of 2008 was false, as he prepared the 2008 tax return showing only $303,000.00 
cash sales. (Rec. 1180) 
54. The Balls specifically asked Bradshaws in the August 11 due diligence 
meeting whether there was any commingling between the Granite and Tile companies. 
Mr. Bradshaw spoke clearly to the Balls saying that there was no significant commingling 
between them at all, except for insignificant amounts. (Rec. 1136 par 16-17) 
55. This was a false statement, as Bradshaw admitted in his March, 2006 email to 
Bush and Cobb that the expenses were "shakey" and that "there was a lot of commingling 
@ between Mays Tile and Mays Granite." (Rec. 1118) 
:1":\. 
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56. That very email contained a 2006 profit and loss statement showing the 2006 
profits to actually be $74,000. (Rec. 1228-1233) 
57. Bradshaw and May would not allow the Balls to take any of the written 
reports from Bradshaw's office. They had to review them at the office and were required 
to leave them there and not take them. Rec. 1198 par 30, 1205 par 29) 
58. At the August 11 Due Diligence meeting, the Balls specifically requested 
Bradshaws to find out why the 2007 books had a credit entry on them for about $120,000 
-$130,000.00. Bush inquired from Bradshaw the reason for the credit, and Bradshaw 
concealed from the Balls that the credit entry was of vital significance. See Declaration 
II of David Ball, (Rec. 1198 par. 22-24, 29) 
59. In fact the credit was one of the very entries which Bradshaws themselves 
made 3 days after the due diligence meeting, and before the Balls bought the company, in 
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order to knowingly conceal $240,000.00 of the 2006 falsified profits on the 2006 tax 
return, according to Bradshaw's testimony at trial (Rec 1827 p 45 line 10 top 47 line 24, 
p 79 line 22 top 81 line 2, p 95 line 1 top 96 line 16) 
60. Bradshaws' bad debt entries to conceal the falsified 2006 sales and profits 
were made after having been directly prompted to do so as a result of the Balls' inquiry. 
(Rec. 1827 p 95 line 1 top 96 line 16, 1155-1156) 
61. The Balls purchased the company after the due diligence meeting with 
Bradshaws based on the false representations made by Bradshaws' attestation services 
that he provided at the due diligence meeting, which Bradshaws knowingly made, and 
upon the lack of vital information regarding bad debt entries which Bradshaws concealed 
from the Balls, and also after the Balls s relied on as coming from a reputable CPA. (Rec. 
1139 par 36-39) 
62. The Balls would have never bought the Tile company had they known that the 
bad debt which was concealed from them existed, that the Promontory sales account had 
stopped when it filed for bankruptcy, that they needed a contractor's license which would 
take them years to obtain, that the actual sales and net income was drastically lower for 
2006 and 2007 than that which was represented to them and the true information and bad 
debt having been concealed from them. (Rec. 1199 par 39, 41) 
63. The Balls tried to make a go of the Tile business they purchased, but were 
unable to do so because of its poor performance which would not have happened if the 
business were as financially strong as the income and profits information and other 
information showed to them by Bush and Bradshaw had been true. (Rec. 1826 p. 8 line 
11 top. 9 line 19) 
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65. The Balls lost their down payment they made on the purchase, together with 
seller financing payments, their investments into the business they made in trying to keep 
it afloat, and other incidental and consequential damages, and interest. (Rec. 1200 par 42) 
66. The Balls filed suit against Mr. May, who later filed for bankruptcy. 
67. The Balls also filed suit against Mr. Bradshaw and his firm for fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation, and Mr. Bush and Coldwell Banker for 
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. (Rec. 1) 
68. Mr. Bradshaw and his company moved for summary judgment b~sed on Utah 
Code Ann.§ 58-26a-602 which shields an accountant from liability·without privity of 
contract, except for fraud, based on there being no contractual relationship between Mr. 
Bradshaw and the Balls, and the Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Bradshaw, except on the fraud claim. Rec. 1025, 1368) 
69. A 4 day trial before a jury was held between Appellants and Mr. Bradshaw and 
his firm on the last existing fraud claim against the accountant. (Rec. 1825-1828) 
70. At trial, Appellants orally moved the Court to allow the jury instruction for 
fraudulent nondisclosure known as Instruction No. CV1811 of the Model Utah Jury 
Instructions, Second Edition (MUTI 2d), and the trial court denied their oral motion to 
include the instruction, in a hearing on the last day of trial, by reasoning that the issue of 
whether the element of duty--an element of the MUJI instruction on fraud--was a 
negligence issue, and therefore the Court disallowed the instruction because it already 
ruled on the negligence issue in summary judgment. (Rec. 1828 p. 6 line 13 top. 12 line 
4) 
71. The jury rendered a verdict against the Balls and in favor of Mr. Bradshaw. 
~ (Rec 1790) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Fraud against Broker. This Court should reverse the Judgment on the Pleadings 
against Appellants rendered by the lower court in its minute entry, because the broker 
should not be allowed to be protected from fraud on an exculpatory agreement with 
buyer. Case law has overruled the unpublished opinion saying that no agreement can 
erase liability for a real estate agent for dishonesty. Furthermore, the Broker 
misrepresented the exculpatory agreement by saying that he had not verified seller 
information, when he had verified it and had filtered the truthful information away from 
the buyer which would have verified the false information the Seller gave the Buyers 
through the broker. 
Breach of Fiduciary by Broker, no expert is needed. The Court should reverse 
summary judgment against Appellants which was entered for not having an expert 
witness which the trial court requred. The issues regarding breach of fiduciary duty are 
not complex, as they involve nondisclosure fraud, which case law show to be the same 
elements as breach of fiduciary duty. Representing profits to be many times more than 
they were, and the representing that income will continue while concealing the 
bankruptcy of a customer which brought 40% of the income-are well within any jury's 
understanding. 
Negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by accountant. Summary Judgment in 
favor of the accountant for his defense of a statute Utah Code Ann§ 58-26a-602 to shield 
himself from liability should be reversed because there was in fact privity of contract 
between the accountant and Buyers. The court in the leading single case Reynolds said 
that not being named in a retention agreement is not grounds to dismiss privity of 
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contract. Cases in many jurisdiction, including with a similar statute have never allowed 
an accountant to conduct a due diligence meeting and withhold vital information. 
There are numerous emails, reports, documents and other writings, which taken 
together satisfy the writing requirement of the statute the accountant uses to ·disclaim 
liability, which the leading case Reynolds said that such requirement is met when they all 
impliedly point to the accountant, or there is a nexus between them. 
Jury Instruction on concealment or nondisclosure fraud. The lower court ruled 
against allowing the jury instruction here because one of the elements was a duty of the 
accountant, which the court earlier dismissed. However, the court dismissed the 
negligence claim because of the requirement of a statute shielding liability, and not 
because of the merits of the claim. Concealment nondisclosure fraud is fraud, 
notwithstanding it has the element of duty, and the statute allows fraud claims. Case law 
~ clearly shows that the duty element here is met by the conduct of the accountant with 
superior knowledge, upon which the buyer is heavily relying on, as the accountant knows. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS SHOULD HA VE A REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS SO THEY CAN PROVE THEIR FRAUD CLAIM 
AGAINST A FALSIFIED EXCULPATORY AGREEMENT. 
An exculpatory agreement should not prevent Plaintiffs-Appellants "the Balls" 
from pursuing their fraud claim against their real estate broker Coldwell Banker 
Commercial (CBC) and the broker's agent Duane Bush (Bush) in their purchase of a 
business. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently mandated that an exculpatory 
agreement never shields liability from fraud based on public policy. 
In the case at bar, the business brokers CBC and Bush concealed from the Balls 
essential company data that the Seller of the business, Steve May, gave to them. They 
gave the Balls other falsified data which CBC and Bush knew to be false based on the 
very data they kept from the Balls which verified the falsity of the falsified information 
the brokers gave. 
In court, CBC and Bush argued that the exculpatory agreement shields them from 
such fraud because it states that the Balls agreed not to rely on the broker, but on the 
Seller of the business. The agreement also states that the broker "has not verified" the 
information. This falsified part of a fraudulent exculpatory "agreement" cannot shield the 
fraud of Bush, and CBC who did verify that the data they gave to the Balls was false by 
the very data they concealed. The Balls had no way of knowing that this kind of fraud 
had been perpetrated on them when they signed an agreement. They had received 
substantial information and business reports from the Seller through the broker. They 
could not have imagined that the broker was concealing some of it. 
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A. The Brokers' unpublished Ruf case. CBC cites an unpublished opinion from 
this Court, Ruf, Inc. v. Icelandic Investments, Inc., 1999 WL 33244779 (Utah App. 1999) 
for the proposition that the contract in the present case enables a business broker to 
commit any and all the fraud he wants with absolute and total impunity, even against the 
plain weight of the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court. This opinion is very brief and 
therefore does not go into a serious analysis, and does not set forth the facts of the case in 
any reasonable detail. 
This case was directly overruled by the fully analyzed published opinion a year 
later by this Court in Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000) 
and by the Utah Supreme Court case Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235,241 (Utah 2002) 
as will be set forth later, but Appellants give the following analysis of Ruf 
notwithstanding. 
The lower court was persuaded by this Ruf opinion, because of CBC and Bush's 
argument that it would be impossible for the Balls to show the element of fraud--that of 
"reasonable reliance" on the broker where the agreement said that the Balls would rely on 
the information from the business owner rather than the broker. 
In the case at bar, however, the Balls did place actual ~easonable reliance on the 
fact that the company reports and information which came from the Seller through the 
broker actually was coming through broker, and not being fraudulently filtered by the 
broker. 
The footnote in the Ruf case states that the provision "contractually defines roles." 
But an essential part of the role of the Broker in the case at bar was to be the conduit of 
the Seller information. The agreement said that "neither COLDWELL BANKER 
COMMERCIAL nor any of its agents and/or employees have verified the representations 
of the Seller ... " Thus it was not the role of the broker to verify the information. This 
22 
does not at all contemplate that the broker would fraudulently filter the information so 
that the reports which the broker knew were plainly false by reason of the reports and 
documents they filtered out. Therefore, the Balls did reasonably rely on the broker being 
an honest conduit of Seller information. The information that the broker fraudulently 
filtered did indeed verify that the selected Seller information was patently false. 
The roles are further clearly defined-that the Broker verified nothing, and 
therefore knew nothing about the truth or falsity of their representations. The document 
states in Paragraph 1 : 
Buyer further acknowledges that neither COLDWELL BANKER 
COlv.11vlERCIAL nor any of its agents and/or employees have verified the. 
representations of the Seller ... " 
Here, the document itself plainly represents that the broker has not verified the 
representations of the Seller. This is plainly opposite from the broker having full 
knowledge of the falsity of their representations--and then concealing the very data 
which would verify the information the broker did disclose was false and fraudulent. 
The Balls understood from the document that Bush and CBC did not investigate 
nor know whether any representations were true, when in fact they plainly did know, and 
maliciously misrepresented the same to the Balls. Balls had every reason to understand 
and did understand that the terms of the Broker Acknowledgment document meant that 
Defendants could not misrepresent that which they did not know. False representations 
fully known by the Defendant Broker were not at all part of that document, according to 
Balls' plain reasonable understanding. At the very least, the document is ambiguous to 
the extent that Balls had no idea that the document would allow CBC or Bush to plainly 
misrepresent that which they plainly knew to be true. See Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 
48 P.3d 941 (Utah 2002) where the court said, "The underlying purpose in construing or 
interpreting contractual provisions is to determine the intentions of the parties." It went 
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on, "The court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions where the 
contractual provision is ambiguous ... capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation ... " 
Contracts are also construed against the drafter, especially a contract of adhesion 
such as this afterthought document which the broker put in with the closing documents 
after all of the broker services were already rendered. See United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 854 P .2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) where the insured in an 
adhesive insurance contract "is entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably 
understand from the policy." No agreement where CBC could freely defraud was ever 
entered into here. 
The Ruf footnote further stated that the clause "identifies the source of any 
representations." When the buyers were getting the Seller information they asked for 
through the broker, they expected that any fraud would be on the part of the Seller if the 
information were false. But they could never have contemplated that the broker was 
filtering contradictory information out. 
The Ruf footnote gave the added clause: "highlights the obligation of the buyer to 
verify information." This is because the broker falsely represented that "neither 
COLDWELL BANKER COivilvIBRCIAL nor any of its agents anµ/or employees have 
verified the representations of the Seller ... " But the very information which would have 
verified that the representations were false were filtered by the broker--because the broker 
saw it and knew that it would verify that the unfiltered information was falsified. The 
broker did verify the information and fraudulently filtered it and concealed it. 
Lastly, the Ruf footnote stated that the the clause "precludes reliance on any 
@ representation made by broker." But the Balls were reasonably relying on the broker 
being an honest conduit of the information which the Seller was providing. The Balls had 
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no earthly reason to suspect otherwise. When the Balls needed to verify Seller 
information, it was customary and proper for them to call the broker to get it from the 
Seller, rather than to try to go to the Seller directly. To go to the Seller directly could be a 
breach of the Seller's privacy which may alert employees of the Seller's business of an 
uncontemplated sale. And the broker here was representing both the Seller and the Buyer 
with a dual agency agreement--with a fiduciary duty to both--making the Balls' reliance 
thatmuch more real and reasonable. 
It should be noted that the Buyer in the Ruf case could not prove any damages even 
against the Seller, much less the broker. Such weak facts are a further distinguishing 
factor from the clear fraud in the case at bar. 
It should be further noted that the Ruf broker had the buyer sign an exculpatory 
agreement at the time in which the buyer was making an offer on a business--before due 
diligence, not as an afterthought--at closing-after the Defendants had finished all of their 
brokering duties, and after the Balls had performed all of their due diligence. The 
signing of the exculpatory agreement after all duties were performed is the same as 
signing a contract without consideration. The broker gave nothing for getting the Balls to 
sign an exculpatory agreement, whereas if the signing took place at the outset before the 
broker provided the services, then the broker's consideration of its services would be real. 
B. The Published Robinson case. This Court in Robinson v. Tripco Investment, 
Inc., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000) analyzed another very similar case containing a 
disclaimer for fraud provision. The disclaimer in the real estate purchase contract in that 
case provided: 
Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and 
judgment and not by reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller 
or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present 
value, future value, income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts 
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the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in 
Section 6. 
Id., p. 221. 
The disclaimer provision here is nearly identical to both the Ruf provision and the 
~ one in the case at bar. The situation here is the same: Any representation made to the 
Buyer by the seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage .. .is purportedly not to be relied on. 
The Court reversed summary judgment on a claim of fraud, even though Seller or 
~ Broker's representations in that case were part of the disclaimer, and further, 
notwithstanding even the merger doctrine which came into being with the conveyance of 
a deed. The disclaimer here even went further to contain the "as is" property condition 
clause. 
This court gave the following analysis concerning the reasonable reliance of the 
buyers: 
1 20 To determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance "must 
be considered with reference to the facts of each case." Conder, 739 P.2d at 
63 8. In general, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact 
without independent investigation. It is only where, under the 
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge 
and intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve as a 
warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make his 
own investigation. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, "'[f]raud as related to 
purchase of real estate may not be predicated on alleged false statements the 
truth of which could have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by the 
party asserting their falsity.'" Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 
875 P.2d 570, 577 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citation omitted). 
1 21 Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case, we 
cannot say as a matter of law that Cardiomed was unreasonable in its 
reliance on Tripp's statements regarding the structural integrity of the 
building ... Robinson questioned Tripp regarding some problems he observed 
and Tripp responded that he had been involved in the construction and 
engineering of the building, and that the building had no structural defects. 
To support that claim, Tripp then provided Robinson with an inspection 
report that failed to note any structural problems with the building. Simply 
stated, because Tripp held himself out as someone with superior knowledge 
of the building and then lent support to his representations by providing an 
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inspection report, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
Cardiomed's reliance was reasonable. 
Id., p. 224-225. 
The Broker's unpublished Ruf case is simply trumped here by this court's more 
recent published case a year later which simply overrules the unpublished ruling, making 
its new ruling in conformity with the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
below. 
C. Utah Supreme Court Case Law. As state earlier, Utah case law prohibits 
contracts which work a fraud resulting from the contract. 
In Kimball Elevator Co., Inc. V. Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., 272 P.2d 583,585 
(Utah 1954), the Utah Supreme Court made it plain that a contract which would work a 
fraud "would have been against public policy and void ... such a contract...would have 
been a fraud ... and consequentially unenforceable." 
This public policy is also true with clauses granting immunity, such as the case at 
bar. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602,608 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme Court said: 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect a 
person against his own fraud on the ground of public policy. A contract 
limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in the absence of 
allegations or proof of fraud. 
See also Ong International v. 1 J'h Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447,453 (Utah 1993) where 
the Court cites "Fraudulent inducement sufficient to nullify a contract ... can vitiate a 
release. This is hombook law." 
D. The Gilbert and Hermansen cases overrule Ruf. Case law also sets forth that 
a duty exists on the part of a broker to be "h~nest, ethical and competent in dealing with 
the buyer." Gilbert Development Corp. V. Wardley Corporation, 245 P.3d 131, 140 
Q 
Q 
(Utah App. 2010). This duty is in fact "independent of any implied or express contracts." Q 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235,241 (Utah 2002): 
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"[t]hough not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective 
purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be honest, 
ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for his or her statutory duty 
to the public." 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). We apply this reasoning 
and hold that Terena as the real estate agent owed a duty, independent of 
any implied or express contracts, to be "honest, ethical, and competent" in 
her relationship with the Hermansens, although she and Tasulis were hired 
by the vendor. 
This duty of honesty, which cannot be contracted away even by an express valid 
contract, would require CBC and Bush to be honest enough to disclose the plain falsity of 
v> their own false representations to The Ball, whom they did admit that they owed a 
fiduciary duty after all. It would also require the broker to be competent enough to advise 
The Balls regarding their need to obtain a contractor's license to purchase the company 
they bought. 
There can be no question that the Utah Supreme Court directly overruled Ruf in 
the plainest language possible in Hermansen, 3 years after the unpublished Ru/ruling was 
made. Yet the brokers here fail to mention it. 
E. Plaintiffs had facts it can take to trial, notwithstanding the ruling on the 
pleadings. 
Had this ruling been Summary Judgment instead of Judgment on the Pleadings, 
Balls had reasonable and substantial evidence to go to trial. Balls performed all 
~ reasonable due diligence before closing, even having reports of profits shown to them by 
the Sellers' Accountant, Defendants Bradshaw and his firm in a due diligence meeting. 
Balls could not reasonably find out the falsity of the representations set forth in their 
Complaint which was purposely withheld from them by Bush and CBC, including that the 
2006 income was $74,703 instead of the $310,165 income Bush represented to them, 
notwithstanding Balls' extensive due diligence of examining all company book data made 
available to them at Seller's Accountant's office. Yet CBC and Bush knew, as seen from 
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subsequent documents emailed from Bush to Balls in 2010 way after closing that Bush 
had the full information showing the lower $74,703 profits for 2006 which he withheld 
from them. See Fact No. 7 and 8. Bush had real reason to filter this document away from 
the Balls' seeing it. 
Balls could not have reasonably found out from their extensive due diligence that 
the bread and butter account, Promontory, had filed for bankruptcy, yet CBC and Bush 
fully knew and had documentation of the bankruptcy filings and even prior news reports 
which they concealed. 
Balls could neither likewise have found out from their reasonable due diligence 
that there was serious commingling of funds between the Tile and the Granite company. 
Balls specifically asked Bush whether there was commingling of funds, Bush made it 
clear that there could not be any commingling between the company; otherwise Coldwell 
Banker absolutely could not market the business in any degree. See Fact Nos. 17-18. 
However, CBC and Bush were fully apprised of all of these facts. They concealed a 
specific email sent to Bush from the Seller's accountant Bradshaw which said, "Keep in 
mind that there was a lot of intercompany commingling between Mays Tile and Mays 
Granite." See Fact Nos. 19-20. This is an email that Bush really wanted filtered away 
from the Balls. 
II. BUYERS DO NOT NEED AN EXPERT WITNESS TO PROVE BROKER 
FRAUD TO A JURY. 
Bush admitted in plain deposition testimony that he had a fiduciary duty as a 
broker to the Balls. 
Q 
A. A jury is eminently qualified to determine whether a real estate agent that Q 
defrauds his client has breached his admitted fiduciary duty. Juries have been called 
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upon to determine fraud, a misrepresentation or other act of dishonesty without the 
@ necessity of an expert to tell the jury whether such a thing has occurred. 
Utah Statute has defined certain acts of real estate agents and brokers to be 
"unlawful for a person licensed or required to be licensed ... " Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f-
401: 
(l)(a) making a substantial misrepresentation; (b) making an 
intentional misrepresentation; ( c) pursuing a continued and flagrant course 
of misrepresentation; ( d) making a false representation or promise through 
an agent, sales agent, advertising, or otherwise; or ( e) making a false 
representation or promise of a character likely to influence, persuade, or 
induce ... 
( 14) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to the licensee's 
principal in a real estate transaction; · 
( 15) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing. 
No expert is necessary to show any reasonable jury concerning any of these acts of 
dishonesty which are plainly defined by the above statute as unlawful for real estate 
~ agents, regardless whether any fiduciary duty even exists. Surely a fiduciary who so acts 
unlawfully against his principal has breached a fiduciary duty to his principal which is 
within the scope of a reasonable jury to determine without expert testimony. 
'~:\ \t!/11 
Bush and CBC argue that they did not need a real estate license to sell businesses. 
However, the statute states that the acts are unlawful "for a person licensed or required to 
be licensed," indicating that since Bush was licensed as a real estate sales agent, the 
statute applies to him whether the license was required or not. CBC even advertises on its 
website that it consists of "commercial real estate professionals." (Rec. 1248) In addition, 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f-201(2) states that a real estate sales license is needed "to buy, 
sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate." The Tile business Bush and CBC sold to 
The Balls leased a warehouse to do business in, which therefore involved the sale of a 
real estate lease with the sale of the business, and therefore a real estate license is required 
here. 
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B. Case Law sets forth that a jury is well suited to determine the issues before 
it in this case without any expert testimony. Bush and CBC cite Preston & Chambers 
v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260,263 (Utah App. 1997) for the proposition that expert testimony is 
required where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by 
particular trades or professions. CBC cites as "dispositive" the case, Posner v. Equity 
Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 222.p.3d 775, (Utah App. 2009). While it is true that the 
performance of medical doctors and engineers would obviously need expert testimony for 
what the standard of care is in a negligence action, This is not applicable or apposite in 
the present case at all. 
In Posner, a real estate broker was sued for negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty concerning what the broker should have done with respect to complex issues 
involving "partial seller financing, the requirement of a surety bond, Posner's out-of-state 
residence, and the split closing dates" of the particular "complex transaction." Id., p. 782, 
par. 22. 
Posner itself also cites two cases, Reese v. Harper 329 P.2d 410 (1958) and 
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983) where no expert was 
needed to prove breaches of duty by a real estate agent: 
Posner cites Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958), for the 
proposition that a real estate agent breaches duties of care and disclosure 
when the agent " fail[ s] to inform and explain to the seller fully of all the 
facts material to the transaction." The facts of Reese differ significantly 
from the present facts. Namely, Reese hinged on the fact that Reese had 
been employed by Harper to sell his real estate for $45,000, approximately 
$15,000 of which would pay off encumbrances on the property, leaving 
Harper with a net profit of $30,000. See id. at 411. Reese presented Harper 
with an offer of $30,000 that appeared to have the buyer pay off the 
encumbrances, but which actually had Harper pay them off, thus bringing 
Harper's net sale total to approximately $15,000. See id. at 411-12. Because 
Reese failed to disclose this fact--a fact that decreased Harper's price by 
roughly half--the Reese court affirmed the jury's determination that Reese 
had breached a fiduciary duty to Harper. See id. at 413. Posner also draws 
on Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), which 
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G 
Q 
refers to the duties of a real estate agent to his principal. As with Reese, the-
facts in Phillips are not as complex as in this case and neither of the cases 
address the issue of when an expert witness is required. 
Posner, fn 7. 
The .present case is obviously likewise very distinguishable from the facts of 
Posner and are fully in line with Reese and Phillips, where Bush and CBC by its agent 
Bush made egregious misrepresentations which are clearly false from the evidence. 
Unlike Posner where the broker's principal could not point to any administrative rules 
identifying what constitutes a falling below a standard of care for a broker, The Balls here 
clearly sets forth the Utah Statute above identifying as unlawful substantial or intentional 
misrepresentations, a flagrant course of misrepresentations, especially which may be 
likely to influence or induce the principal's action, or even any dishonest dealing. Such 
actions are unlawful for a broker against anyone, much less for a broker who owed a 
~ fiduciary duty to the person he is defrauding. There is nothing at all too "complex" for a 
jury to understand about fraud and dishonesty. False representations, fraud and 
d~shonesty are unquestionably "within the common knowledge and experience of the 
layperson" which Posner itself states as expert testimony being unnecessary. Id., par. 22 
at p. 782. 
Balls have argued above that Utah law does not allow a real estate agent or broker 
to exculpate himself by an exculpatory agreement from the fraudulent conduct which that 
agent then perpetrates. If this court were to determine that Bush and CBC's exculpatory 
agreement prevails against the Balls' fraud claims against them, then surely such 
egregious fraud, dishonesty and unlawful acts which a jury will surely find here, cannot 
now be seriously argued in good faith as being beyond the jury's comprehension. 
Case law states that fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure have the same elements, which 
elements are within the grasp of a jury without an expert witness. In Gilbert 
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Development Corp. V. Wardley Corporation, 245 P.3d 131, 139 (Utah App. 2010), the 
court held that there are three elements of breach of fiduciary duty: ( 1) a fiduciary duty to 
disclose material information, (2) knowledge of the information, and (3) failure to 
disclose the information. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52 par.18-22, 48 P.3d 235, 
241 (Utah 2002) This court went on to note: "where a verdict (meaning by a jury) has 
been entered against GDC on its breach of fiduciary duty claim, its claim for fraudulent 
nondisclosure based on proving the same elements at a higher standard of proof must 
also-and necessarily-fail." This Court here is saying that the elements of nondisclosure 
fraud are the very same elements of breach of fiduciary duty in the case, but with the 
higher standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence. Hence a jury is well suited to 
find breach of fiduciary duty just as it can find fraudulent nondisclosure. 
In Hermansen, if you cannot prove breach of fiduciary duty, then you cannot prove 
the same elements constituting fraud with the higher clear and convincing standard of 
proof. Similarly in the present case, where the Balls can prove fraud--but was prevented 
from doing so by the trial court by reason of an exculpatory agreement, the Balls can then 
just as easily prove breach of fiduciary duty by proving the same elements of fraud or 
fraudulent nondisclosure with the lower standard of proof. Hence there can be no 
argument that proving fiduciary duty is not any more complex than proving fraud. 
The brokers never have alleged that the Balls would need an expert to prove their 
fraud. Therefore, there is no sense in the brokers' argument that the Balls need an expert 
to prove the same elements of fraud with a lesser standard of proof. A jury is well 
qualified to determine whether fraud exists or whether it does not as a breach of fiduciary 
duty 
Appellants cannot fathom how the trial court would rule that fraud or non-
disclosure fraud necessitates an expert witness. There was significant analysis in the 
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Gilbert case about jury instructions in the 7 day jury trial in that case concerning real 
\ii? estate agents, without a single mention of an expert witness, especially on the details of 
the breach of duty, and that which the jury was instructed regarding what disclosures 
were material. Id., p. 142-144. The jury was also sufficiently instructed on the elements 
of breach of fiduciary duty. Id., p. 144. No mention of expert testimony exists in the 
entire case. 
@ 
Similarly, in the case at bar, a jury is eminently competent to decide whether the 
cash sales income for a key year was $74,000.00 and not the falsely represented 
$310,000.00 is a material fact in-the Balls' decision to buy the company. It is further well 
within the purview of a jury to decide whether the nondisclosure and false representation 
concerning the stoppage of 40% of the ongoing sales income of the Tile business is 
material to a buyer of the company. When the broker makes it crystal clear that there 
cannot be any commingling between the Tile company they were marketing to the Balls, 
and the Granite company also owned by the Seller, it is way within the understanding of a 
jury to decide nondisclosure and false representation, when the broker knew that there 
~ was serious commingling. Lastly, when a broker lists and sells many commercial 
businesses which require state licensing, a duty to disclose to the Balls concerning what 
state license would be required when asked by the Balls, is a basic duty to tell the truth a 
jury can clearly understand. 
At the Court hearing, the Court was persuaded by the Broker's counsel's argument 
regarding the "immense complexity" of the brokering of a business. As a result, the 
Court inexplicably ruled that an expert witness was necessary "to establish a standard of 
care" (Rec. 1824 p. 68) or "what particular duties and responsibilities a business broker 
l.(J} would owe in connection with transmitting information to a prospective buyer." (Rec. 
1824 p. 69) This ruling completely overlooks the plain fraudulent misrepresentations 
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made by the broker, which fraud is without question an issue a jury can decide. A blatant 
misrepresentation of net income to be less than 1/4 of what it actually is, is fraud, plain 
and simple, and not some esoteric complexity to compare with a doctor's duty of care. 
And DBD and Bush has never alleged that fraud can only be proven by an expert 
witness. 
III. PLAINTIFFS HAD PRIVITY OF CONTRACT WITH BRADSHA WS IN THE 
DUE DILIGENCE MEETING, AS MAYS, BRADSHA WS AND THE BALLS ALL 
AGREED THAT THE BALLS WOULD BE THE DIRECT THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARIES OF THE DUE DILIGENCE SERVICES OF BRADSHA WS. 
Bradshaws cite Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-26a-602 as a statute which lets Bradshaws 
off the hook for the accounting attestation services they gave to The Balls. This statute 
states: 
A licensee, a CPA firm registered under this chapter, and any employee, 
partner, member, officer, or shareholder of a licensee or CPA firm are not 
liable to persons with whom they are not in privity of contract for civil 
damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in 
connection with professional services performed by that person, except for: 
(1) acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or 
intentional misrepresentations; or 
(2) other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person 
performing the professional services: 
(a) knew that a primary intent of the client was for the 
professional services to benefit or influence the particular 
person seeking to establish liability; and 
(b) identified in writing to the client that the professional 
services performed on behalf of the client were intended to be 
relied upon by the particular person seeking to establish 
liability. 
Bradshaws allege that Balls were not in privity of contract with the Balls, and second, 
there was no writing wherein Bradshaws "identified in writing to the client an intent that 
the plaintiff rely." This statute does not bar The Balls' recovery in this case. 
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A. Balls were in full privity of contract with Bradshaws as a third party 
~ beneficiary. Reynolds v. Bickel, 307 P.3d 570 (Utah 2013) is the Utah case which 
interprets the above statute and is also that which Bradshaws rely on. In that case, the 
Court indicated that the third party "Mr. Reynolds conceded that he is not in privity with 
Defendants [accountants]." Id., p. 572. The case noted in the footnote [2] the following: 
Had Mr. Reynolds not made this concession, we would consider whether 
the actions of Mr. Reynolds and Defendants amounted to a relationship of 
accountant and client notwithstanding the fact that the retention agreement 
did not name Mr. Reynolds as a client. 
This statement from the Court amounts to a statement that the Court would 
consider whether an accountant client relationship existed even though the retention 
agreement did not name the client directly. 
At the time in which the Balls were making an offer to Steven May to purchase 
May's Tile, the Balls entered into a contingency provision where the sale was contingent 
upon "Seller proving to Buyer's satisfaction the financial information for subject 
business." (Rec. 1189) The Balls then requested to see the books, whereupon Mr. May 
said that the books contained extremely sensitive information, and that he could not give 
the Balls the books. Then, an agreement was reached between the Balls and Mr. May, 
wherein Mr. May would hire and pay for his accountant Bradshaws to provide the 
@ accounting and attestation services in a due diligence meeting, and where the Balls would 
ask due diligence questions to Bradshaws and get answers from him "to their 
satisfaction." 
The Balls' Expert Witness Accountant Brandon Ball testified in deposition that 
Bradshaws' services fell in the realm of accountant services ... and therefore, created a 
relationship, accountant-client relationship, between Mr. Bradshaw and Reperex and Mr. 
Ball. (Rec. 1141) 
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This agreement wherein Mr. May would provide the company accountant was an 
agreement where the Balls would be the third party beneficiary of Bradshaws which Mr. 
May bought and paid for. Bradshaws fully understood that this was a due diligence 
meeting where the Balls were investigating the books prior to buying the company. Mr. 
Bradshaw was asked, "Were you asked to do any help for the prospective sale to the 
Balls?" Bradshaw answered: "Yes." Mr. Bradshaw then described what help that was in 
detail, which included showing to the Balls numerous documents, tax returns and reports, 
including ones he extracted from the quickbooks files. (Rec. 1170-1173) 
Hence the Balls were the client of Bradshaws for that due diligence hearing, which 
Mays bought and paid for as agreed. Neither Steve May nor his company received any 
service from that due diligence meeting. The Balls would never have purchased the 
company without the help, attestation and answers to their questions from Bradshaw, 
upon which they could rely from the accountant's services as agreed by all, and for which 
May paid for in behalf of the Balls so that the Balls could have "Seller proving to Buyer's 
satisfaction the financial information for subject business." Hence, the Balls were in full 
privity of contract with the Bradshaws, the same as an insurance company would owe 
insurance to a third party contract beneficiary who is an insured. 
Lastly, there are a number of courts which has analyzed a "near-privity" approach 
in holding accountants liable in situations where they should clearly be held liable. In 
lvfl--Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. DeLoitte & Touche, 463 S.E.2d 618,625 (S.C.App. 
1995) the court analyzed case law in several jurisdictions regarding the issue of "near 
privity of contract" as follows: 
The scope of a public accountant's duty to third persons who use and rely 
on their reports is an issue of first impression in South Carolina. However, 
in the states considering the issue, three main approaches have developed. 
The most restrictive approach, requiring strict contractual privity before 
liability could be imposed, was first enunciated by Chief Judge Cardozo of 
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the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & 
Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441,446 (1931). The Ultramares strict privity 
standard was relaxed somewhat by the court in Credit Alliance Corp. v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536,493 N.Y.S.2d 435,483 N.E.2d 110 
(N.Y.1985) to extend recovery to third parties enjoying a relationship to the 
accountant that "sufficiently approaches privity." Thus, under New York's 
"near privity" approach, accountants may be liable to third parties only if 
( 1) the accountants actually know their reports will be used for a particular 
purpose; (2) the accountants know that a nonclient is expected to rely on 
the reports in furtherance of a particular purpose; and (3) there has been 
some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or 
parties, which evinces the accountant's understanding of that party's or 
parties' reliance. Id. Several states follow New York's "near privity" 
approach. See, e.g., Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 
So.2d 390 (Ala.1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 
115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989); Thayer v. Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 793 
P.2d 784 (1990) (adopting modified version of near-privity approach). 
The Utah statute which the accountant here wants to shield himself from liability, 
should not be construed so narrowly to not include a sufficient closeness to privity to 
make a person liable where an accountant should be liable, as in the present case where 
I@ the Balls had nobody else to offer due diligence services, where the accountant agreed to 
provide the attestation services in a due diligence meeting where he knew that the only 
purpose of the meeting was to provide such due diligence services to the Balls. 
The Supreme Court said that "it would consider what would amount to a 
relationship of accountant and client notwithstanding the fact that an agreement did not 
name him as a client." Reynolds, p. 572, fn 2. 
B. Bradshaws fully identified in writing that Bradshaws were giving 
information upon which Bush and his prospects would rely. Bradshaws cite Reynolds 
v. Bickel, 307 p.3d 570 (Utah 2013) to attempt to show that there was no writing where 
Bradshaw "agreed" to provide accounting services. However, Bradshaw fulfilled the 
writing requirement by "identifying in writing" an intent that the the Balls rely. The 
@ Court in Reynolds said: 
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[ the statute] does not require an -explicit statement in a single writing; it 
requires an "identification in writing" that a third party is intended to rely 
on the accountant's services ... 
Additionally, all of the e-mails and spreadsheets ... manifest an" implied 
reference" to one another, based on the contents of the writings and the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction ... The common theme of the 
email and spreadsheets ... reflect what.was the purpose of their retention. 
Id., p. 574-575. 
Similarly, the emails and documents sent by Bradshaw to Bush for his prospects 
show that Bradshaw's professional services were intended to be relied upon by Bush and 
his prospects, and the Balls. 
In the case at bar, Bradshaw's numerous written responses to questions also show 
that he was giving accounting advice and that he intended to give the accounting advice. 
These writings serve the full purpose of the writing portion of Utah Code Ann. section 
58-26a-602 which requires the accountant "identifiy] in writing to the client an intent that 
the client rely on the same. 
In addition, Mr. Bradshaw has acknowledged in writing in emails that he was 
providing help to May's business broker Duane Bush for Bush's prospective buyers of the 
company, including emails dated February 20, 2008, February 21, 2008, February 22, 
2008, March 12, 2008 5 emails on March 13, 2008, and an email on March 27, 2008. 
(Rec. 1118-113 8) Bradshaw provided Bush information, documents and reports needed 
for Bush's prospect "to commence his due diligence review." (Rec. 1128) In a March 25 
email, Bush states, "I have spoken with Steve [May] and he said this would be best 
coming from you [Bradshaw]." (Rec. 1119) Bush then asks for month by months profit 
and loss reports because "the bank is requesting this. They want to see why the 36% 
revenue drop from 06 v. 07." Bradshaw responds with a detailed explanation to Bush and 
his buyers about details of the company, including a statement that the "expenses are a bit 
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shakey" and "there was a lot of intercompany commingling between Mays Tile and Mays 
'JJ Granite." (Rec. 1118) 
Bradshaw also admits in deposition that the advice to Bush's pr~spects was 
ongoing, where he responded to the question "Were you asked to do any help for the 
prospective sale to the Balls? Bradshaw answered "Yes. I was asked to provide similar 
documents to -- to Duane Bush as we had before. Many of them were the same 
documents. Nothing changed." (Rec.1170, lines 7-20) Here Bradshaw admits that all of 
the information given in emails to Bush applied to the Balls as a prospective purchaser. 
Bradshaw then produced the written documents to the Balls. 
Balls testified at trial and Bradshaw directly admitted that the Balls came on 
August 11, 2008 to a due diligence meeting. (Rec 1827 at page 79, lines 16-20). 
Bradshaw issued a written billing to May for the due diligence meeting for which the 
Balls were the contract beneficiary. Bradshaw admitted in deposition issuing such a 
billing--writing in his 2012 deposition at p. 115, line 24 top. 116 line 9. 
There was a communication, obviously an email since deleted and not produced, 
sent between Bush, May and Bradshaw to set up the due diligence meeting. (Rec. 1826--
Trial testimony at p. 51, 12-9.) 
At that due diligence meeting, Bradshaw produced several written reports, 
including profit and loss statements to the Balls. (Rec 1827 at page 83 line 18 top. 84, 
line 23.) 
In a written fax from May to Bradshaw, a report showing credits which Balls 
inquired about in the due diligence meeting were sent to Bradshaw immediately after that 
due diligence meeting, about the credits the Balls specifically inquired about, which had 
~ bad debt entries entered on them, including one for the amount the Balls inquired about at 
the meeting. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 66, p. 5 of fax) This document had a writing on it 
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showing "See me, Russ" and specific written markings on the report setting forth the bad 
debt. This particular document was an integral part of the inquiries of the Balls at the due 
diligence meeting where they asked about a $130, 000.00 credit, and which Bradshaw 
remembered that the Balls asked about at the meeting. This document served as a keen 
reminder to Bradshaw, wherein he gave testimony in depth about the credit memos the 
Balls inquired about, and after which he investigated himself what the credit memos 
were, including the specific $129,008.10 entry. Bradshaw remembered entering about 
$236,000 in bad debt expense 3 days later Rec 1827 at page 46, line 12-14, and Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 66, which bad debt entries was kept back from the Balls--all from this document. 
It should be noted that this last Exhibit 66 document was not produced by 
Bradshaw in discovery in direct contravention to 5 discovery requests for the same, and 
was only discovered after further hearings where Bradshaw was caught keeping back 
documents. (Rec 1568-1569) There may be other writings which may exist and may be 
still kept back by Bradshaw's flagrant disobedience to many of Balls' discovery requests 
for them. 
All of these documents were produced regarding Bradshaw's involvement with the 
Balls' investigation into the company and also concerning the August 11, 2008 due 
diligence meeting. 
Later in discovery, the Balls obtained copies of the quickbooks files which 
Bradshaw maintained in his office and from which he would have obtained his due 
diligence reports. (Rec. 122) 
All of these writings show that Bradshaw was directly involved with the Balls, and 
further that he was the accountant which the Balls went to to conduct their due diligence 
meeting. They all together show that the Balls expected to rely on Bradshaw for his 
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attestation services at the due diligence meeting. and that Bradshaw knew that this was a 
~ due diligence meeting for which the Balls would rely on as a due diligence meeting. 
In Reynolds, the Court said, "we hold that for purposes of Section 602(2)(b ), one 
or more writings, not all of which are authored by the party to be charged, may be 
~ considered together as a memorandum if there is a nexus between them." Id., p. 574. 
That is true for all of these emails and documents, including the written documents given 
at the due diligence meeting. These in connection with Bradshaw's sworn testimony that 
he knew that it was a due diligence meeting should suffice. (Rec 1827 at page 79, lines 
16-20) Bradshaw also confirmed that all of the written documents and emails sent to 
Bush applied to the Balls as well as Bush's former prospect. (Rec.1170, lines 7-20) 
In Reynolds, the Court further analyzed: 
The common theme of the e-mail and spreadsheets are the tax implications for Mr. 
Reynolds of the sale of the Altaview Companies. Indeed, these writings all reflect 
what Defendants have admitted was the purpose of their retention: to minimize 
Mr. Reynolds's personal tax liability from the sale of the Altaview Companies. 
Mr. Reynolds was the only person or entity who could benefit from Mr. 
Bickel's advice ... he was impliedly communicating " that [his] professional 
services ... were intended to be relied upon by" Mr. Reynolds. 
Id., p. 575. 
Similarly, the Balls fully relied on Mr. Bradshaw in the only due diligence meeting 
@ where the Balls could get the information they need to verify the information about the 
company they were buying. The due diligence meeting was intended solely for the Balls' 
benefit. The data and reports which Bradshaw gave to the Balls was specifically for that 
(@ sole purpose. Nobody else benefitted. The writings all similarly impliedly communicated 
this purpose. 
There are similar cases to the one at bar in Illinois with facts not so egregiously 
pointing to the accountant's liability, and where Illinois has a statute very similar to the 
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Utah statute limiting liability. In Chestnut Corp. v. Pestine, Brinati, Gamer, LTD, 667 
N.E.2d 544 (Ill App. 1996) the court recognized that unless accountants agree in writing 
to expose themselves to liability, they could never be held to be liable in any real 
situations where they should be to people they know are relying on them. In that case, 
investors visited the accountant's office and were given financial statements they were 
told were accurate. In so doing, that court liberally interpreted the writing requirement. 
Similarly here, where there are many writings which impliedly communicate that the 
Balls were relying on Bradshaw for attestation services in a due diligence meeting, those 
writings should be given a liberal·interpretation. 
This is not a situation where an accountant is being held liable to third parties 
which they must "seek out...for an indeterminate period of time after their work is 
prepared ... " Builders Bank v. Barry Finkel and Associates, 790 N.E.2d 30, 37 (Ill. App. 
2003). It is when the "primary intent" or the "purpose and intent...was to benefit or 
influence the third-party." Id., p. 36. "To be sufficient Plaintiffs' complaint must allege 
facts showing that the purpose and intent... was to benefit or influence the third-party 
plaintiff." Clarkv. Feder Semo and Bard, P.C., 634 F.Supp.2d 99, 108 (D.D.C. 2009) 
In summary, liability should unquestionably accrue to an accountant who provides 
attestation services in a due diligence meeting where the accountant knows that the 
Plaintiffs are relying on the accountant's information as the only source of due diligence 
verification, and where the only purpose of such a meeting is for due diligence. The Utah 
Statute cannot have been intended to shield accountants so that they can do unjustifiable 
harm with impunity. It must have the same intent as the statutes and case law of most 
jurisdictions. 
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IV. HE JURY SHOULD HA VE BEEN INSTRUCTED WITH THE MUJI JURY 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING NONDISCLOSURE FRAUD. 
Appellants the Balls requested the Court to have the jury instructed with that 
Instruction No. CV181 l on Fraudulent Nondisclosure, of the Model Utah Jury 
@ Instructions Second Edition (MUJI 2d), and the trial court denied their oral motion to 
include the instruction, in a hearing on the last day of trial before the jury was to be 
instructed. 
The instruction is as follows: 
CVl 811 Concealment or fraudulent non-disclosure. 
I have determined that [name of plaintiff] was in a [type of relationship] 
that gave [name of defendant] a duty to disclose an important fact to [name 
of plaintiff]. You must decide whether [name of defendant] failed to 
disclose an important fact. To establish that [name of defendant] failed to 
disclose an important fact, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the 
following: 
(1) that [name of defendant] knew [describe the important fact] and failed to 
disclose it to [name of plaintiff]; 
(2) that [name of plaintiff] did not know [describe the important fact]; and 
(3) that [name of defendant]'s failure to disclose [describe the important 
fact] was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiffj's damages. 
References 
Anderson v. Kriser, 2011 UT 66. 
Gilbert Development Corp., v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361. 
Yazd v. Woodside, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006). 
Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 561 (Utah App. 2007). 
Committee Notes 
This instruction should be given only if the Court has determined that a 
special relationship imposing the higher duty is established as a matter of 
law. Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 561 (Utah App. 2007). . 
MUJI 2d, CV181 l. 
The court gave as reasons for denying the instruction the fact that the Court had 
already dismissed the negligence claim on summary judgment, therefore, on the duty 
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requirement of the fraudulent nondisclosure element, "effectively I've determined there 
was no duty ... and in dismissing the negligence claim, ... there was not a special 
relationship. (Rec. 1828, p. I I line 1 top 12 16, p.22 line 17 top. 23 line 6) 
The Court further indicated that it understood that the accountant owed a duty of 
confidentiality to the first client--May's Custom Tile and Mr. May, and if the accountant 
Bradshaw were to "now have a duty, a potentially conflicting duty to speak up, even in 
violation of a confidentiality obligation ... " then a duty to disclose to the Balls as buyers in 
the due diligence meeting would appear to further jeopardize his duty to his first client. 
(Rec. 1828, p 9 line 6-22) 
In using this analysis, the Court rejected the stock MUJI instruction on fraudulent 
nondisclosure without a serious analysis on what the cases supporting that stock 
instruction indicated concerning what constitutes a "special relationship" which would 
impose the higher duty element of fraudulent nondisclosure. 
The court further indicated that it had already rejected the element of duty when it 
granted summary judgment in favor of the accountant on the n~gligence claim. The court 
did not take into account that it dismissed the negligence claim by reason of the statute 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602 shielding accountants from liability as discussed above. 
Instead, the Court analyzed that it had earlier found no duty to exist. In fact the 
fraudulent nondisclosure instruction is fraud, and not negligence, and the statute excepts 
fraud-accountants are liable for fraud notwithstanding the statute. Hence, fraudulent 
nondisclosure, which must be proven with clear and convincing evidence, is excepted 
from the summary judgment dismissal under that statute. Therefore, when duty is an 
element of fraud as it is here, it survives the dismissal the Court thought that it gave under 
that statute. 
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A. Duty which grows out of a relationship. In Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 
572 (Utah App. 2007), this court said: 
A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a 
duty than one, for example, in which parties are in privity of contract. Age, 
knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive 
ability are but the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances 
that a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by one 
party to another. Where a disparity in one or more of these circumstances 
distorts the balance between the parties in a relationship to the degree that 
one party is exposed to unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by 
creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that 
does not reward exploitation of its advantage. 
Here, this Court gave a a full spectrum of analysis-"a multitude of life 
circumstances" on what may constitute a duty. This duty is also "strictly a question of 
\;j law" and therefore a trial judge has no discretion on its determination. Id. 
In the case at bar, the Balls were wholly dependent on Bradshaw for truthful due 
diligence information. The Balls were depending on the knowledge, influence, 
sophistication and cognitive ability of the May's Tile Company accountant as having 
superior knowledge, plus Bradshaw's knowledge that the Balls, who knew nothing of the 
truth of the company, and who were entirely dependent on the company's accountant to 
give truthful information. The disparity in all of these circumstances was profound in 
every respect. The parties agreed that the due diligence the Balls would be allowed to do 
was to review the books with the company accountant. And the accountant admitted at 
trial that he knew that this was a due diligence meeting. (Rec. 1827, p 79, line 18) 
Without the accountant having a duty to tell the truth, this simply would not have 
I@ been a due diligence meeting, but a fraud, masquerading as a due diligence meeting. The 
relationship which Moore describes is unquestionably present. Moore was about a 
general contractor who was found to owe a duty to a buyer. "The communication of 
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material information to [the home buyers] is one of the obligations that flow from [the 
builder-contractor's] assumption of its legal duty." Id., p. 573 
In Yazd v. Woodside Homes, 143 P .3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006) it was a homebuilder's 
"status as builder-contractor that gives rise to its legal duty to the home buyers." in 
another fraudulent nondisclosure case cited as a reference to the MUJI instruction. In 
Anderson v. Kriser, 266 P.3d 819, 826-827 (Utah 2011), the Supreme Court held that a 
developer can be liable to a buyer who hires his own builder. 
It was more egregious for Bradshaw to hide vital information in what he knew to 
be a due diligence meeting with the buyers than the facts are in Yazd and Anderson. 
Bradshaw said at trial that he would get back to the Balls about a $130,000.00 credit 
inquiry right in the due diligence meeting, and then did not, but yet Bradshaw entered 
$236,000.00 in bad debt on the company books 3 days after the due diligence meeting 
which included that very $130,000.00 inquiry which he knew was not merely some 
irrelevant adjustment, but actual bad debt the Balls knew nothing about. See Fact nos. 58, 
59, 60. It should be noted that both of the above cases concerned the purchase of 
property. 
In the present case, the trial court seemed to say that the duty of confidentiality to 
his business client seemed to trump any duty to the Balls in the due diligence meeting. 
However, in Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 246 P.3d 131, 140 (Utah App. 
2010), this Court said that "a seller's real estate agent must "be honest, ethical, and 
competent" in dealing with the buyer." This imposes a duty on the real estate agent who 
similarly has confidential duties owed to his client to disclose to the buyer "so that the 
buyer has sufficient accurate information to make an informed decision." Again, in the 
case at bar, Bradshaw knew that the Balls were relying on him to give sufficient accurate 
information, and therefore he had a clear duty to do so. 
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The trial court also was concerned about whether such a duty should be imposed 
on professionals such as accountants. A real estate agent as in Gilbert surely was a 
professional. In other jurisdictions accountants have been held liable for omissions as 
well as misrepresentations. See Newby v. Enron v. Lay, 235 F.Supp. 2d 549{S.D.Tex 
2002) where a lawyer, accountant or bank makes a material misstatement ( or omission) is 
liable; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldstone, Simmons and Starrett, 952 
F.Supp. 2d 1060, 1089, 1091 (D.N.M.2013) where a mortgage company's chief 
accounting officers were responsible for their "knowing or being reckless in not knowing" 
facts that they col)cealed. 
In this due diligence meeting with the Balls, Bradshaw cannot argue that he had 
such a duty of confidentiality to Steve May and May's Custom Tile so as to lie and/or to 
conceal important material vital information from the Balls in their due diligence at his 
~ office which he agreed to do. If his conflict of interest were so great, he would 
necessarily have had to recuse himself. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs--Appellants the Balls have not been able to have their day in court by 
reason of the dismissal of their fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the real 
estate broker Coldwell Banker Commercial and its real estate agent Duane Bush. The 
Balls also have been stopped from having their day in court against the accounting firm 
Child Van Wagoner and Bradshaw and its accountant J. Russton Bradshaw on their 
claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The Balls have further not had the 
jury properly instructed on concealment fraud from the MUJI 2d. The Balls request to 
have their day in court on their claims of Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Negligent 
Misrepresentation against Bradshaw and his firm, on both of their claims of Fraud and 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Coldwell Banker and Bush, and where the jury is 
instructed on concealment nondisclosure fraud against Bradshaw. 
Dated this August 21, 2015 
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ADDENDUM 
58-26a-602. Privity. 
A licensee, a CPA firm registered under this chapter, and any employee, partner, 
member, officer, or shareholder of a licensee or CPA firm are not liable to persons with 
whom they are not in privity of contract for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, 
decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by that 
person, except for: 
( 1) acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or intentional 
misrepresentations; or 
(2) other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person performing the 
professional services: 
(a) knew that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit 
or influence the particular person seeking to establish liability; and 
(b) identified in writing to the client that the professional services performed on behalf 
of the client were intended to be relied upon by the particular person seeking to establish 
liability. 
61-2f-401. Grounds for disciplinary action. 
The following acts are unlawful for a person licensed or required to be licensed under 
this chapter: 
(1) 
(a) making a substantial misrepresentation; 
(b) making an intentional misrepresentation; 
( c) pursuing a continued and flagrant course of misrepresentation; 
(d) making a false representation or promise through an agent, sales agent, advertising, 
or otherwise; or 
( e) making a false representation or promise of a character likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce; 
(2) acting for more than one party in a transaction without the informed consent of the 
parties; 
(3) 
(a) acting as an associate broker or sales agent while not affiliated with a principal 
broker; 
(b) representing or attempting to represent a principal broker other than the principal 
broker with whom the person is affiliated; or 
( c) representing as sales agent or having a contractual relationship similar to that of 
sales agent with a person other than a principal broker; 
(4) 
(a) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit money that belongs to 
another and comes into the person's possession; 
(b) commingling money described in Subsection (4)(a) with the person's own money; 
or 
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(c) diverting money described in Subsection (4)(a) from the purpose for which the 
money is received; 
(5) paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as defined by the commission, to Q 
a person not licensed under this chapter, except that valuable consideration may be 
shared: 
(a) with a principal broker of another jurisdiction; or 
(b) as provided under: 
(i) Title 16, Chapter 10a, Utah Revised Business Corporation Act; 
(ii) Title 16, Chapter 11, Professional Corporation Act; or G 
(iii) Title 48, Chapter 2c, Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, or Title 48, 
Chapter 3a, Utah Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, as appropriate 
pursuant to Section 48-3a-1405; 
(6) for a principal broker, paying or offering to pay a sales agent or associate broker 
who is not affiliated with the principal broker at the time the sales agent or associate Q 
broker earned the compensation; 
(7) being incompetent to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent in 
such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public; 
(8) failing to voluntarily furnish a copy of a document to the parties before and after 
the execution of a document; 
(9) failing to keep and make available for inspection by the division a record of each Q 
transaction, including: 
(a) the names of buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors; 
(b) the identification of real estate; 
( c) the sale or rental price; 
( d) money received in trust; GiJ 
( e) agreements or instructions from buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors; and 
(t) any other information~required by rule; 
(10) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase, sale, or rental of real estate, whether 
the purchase, sale, or rental is made for that person or for an undisclosed principal; 
(11) being convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude within five years 
of the most recent application: " 
(a) regardless of whether the criminal offense is related to real estate; and 
(b) including: 
(i) a conviction based upon a plea of nolo contendere; or 
(ii) a plea held in abeyance to a criminal offense involving moral turpitude; 
(12) advertising the availability of real estate or the services of a licensee in a false, G; 
misleading, or deceptive manner; 
(13) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who is a branch manager, failing to 
exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of the principal broker's or branch 
manager's licensed or unlicensed staff; 
(14) violating or disregarding: 
(a) this chapter; ~ 
(b) an order of the commission; or 
( c) the rules adopted by the commission and the division; 
(15) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to the licensee's principal in a real 
estate transaction; 
( 16) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing; G 
( 17) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule; 
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( 18) having one of the following suspended, revoked, surrendered, or cancelled on the 
basis of misconduct in a professional capacity that relates to character, honesty, integrity, 
or truthfulness: 
(a) a real estate license, registration, or certificate issued by another jurisdiction; or 
(b) another license, registration, or certificate to engage in an occupation or profession 
issued by this state or another jurisdiction; 
(19) failing to respond to a request by the division in an investigation authorized under 
this chapter, including: 
(a) failing to respond to a subpoena; 
(b) withholding evidence; or 
(c) failing to produce documents or records; 
(20) in the case of a dual licensed title licensee as defined in Section 3 lA-2-402: 
(a) providing a title insurance product or service without the approval required by 
Section 3 lA-2-405; or 
(b) knowingly providing false or misleading information in the statement required by 
Subsection 3 lA-2-405(2); 
(21) violating an independent contractor agreement between a principal broker and a 
sales agent or associate broker as evidenced by a final judgment of a court; 
(22) 
(a) engaging in an act of loan modification assistance that requires Ii censure as a 
mortgage officer under Chapter 2c, Utah Residential Mortgage Practices and Licensing 
Act, without being licensed under that chapter; 
(b) engaging in an act of foreclosure rescue without entering into a written agreement 
specifying what one or more acts of foreclosure rescue will be completed; 
( c) inducing a person who is at risk of foreclosure to hire the licensee to engage in an 
act of foreclosure rescue by: 
(i) suggesting to the person that the licensee has a special relationship with the 
person's lender or loan servicer; or 
(ii) falsely representing or advertising that the licensee is acting on behalf of: 
(A) a government agency; 
(B) the person's lender or loan servicer; or 
(C) a nonprofit or charitable institution; or 
(d) recommending or participating in a foreclosure rescue that requires a person to: 
(i) transfer title to real estate to the licensee or to a third-party with whom the licensee 
has a business relationship or financial interest; 
(ii) make a mortgage payment to a person other than the person's loan servicer; or 
(iii) refrain from contacting the person's: 
(A) lender; · 
(B) loan servicer; 
(C) attorney; 
(D) credit counselor; or 
(E) housing counselor; 
(23) as a principal broker, placing a lien on real property, unless authorized by law; or 
(24) as a sales agent or associate broker, placing a lien on real property for an unpaid 
commission or other compensation related to real estate brokerage services. 
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Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, CV1811. 
CVl 811 Concealment or fraudulent non-disclosure. 
I have determined that [name ofplaintiffJ was in a [type of relationship] 
that gave [ name of defendant] a duty to disclose an important fact to [ name 
of plaintiffJ. You must decide whether [name of defendant] failed to 
disclose an important fact. To establish that [name of defendant] failed to 
disclose an important fact, [ name of plaintiffJ must prove all of the 
following: 
( 1) that [ name of defendant] knew [ describe the important fact] and failed to 
disclose it to [name of plaintiffJ; 
(2) that [ name of plaintiffJ did not know [ describe the important fact]; and 
(3) that [name of defendant]'s failure to disclose [ describe the important 
fact] was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiffJ's damages. 
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Th,rd Judicial o· . nT rstnct 
By . 
Deputy Clerk.... G;;) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPEREX, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CHILD, VAN WAGONER, BRADSHAW, 
PLCC, et al., 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 110916924 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
Before the court is Defendants Coldwell Banker Commercial, NRT and Duane 
Bush's (''Caldwell's") motion for judgment on the pleadings. · The court reviewed the 
moving and opposition papers and heard oral argument on September 18, 2012. At that 
time, the court stayed the case, and deferring ruling on the motion, until the Utah Court 
of Appeals issued its decision in a related case then pending before that court. On 
October 24, 2012, Coldwell filed a Request to Submit for Decision, notifying the court 
that the Utah Court of Appeals had issued its opinion in the related case, and requesting 
a ruling on the pending motion. Based on the papers filed and the arguments of counsel, 
the court now rules on Caldwell's motion as follows: 
Plaintiffs have asserted three claims for relief against the Coldwell defendants, for 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Coldwell argues these 
1 
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claims are barred by a non-reliance clause in the broker agreement. The underlying 
facts are essentially identical to those in Ruf, Inc. v. Icelandic Investments, Inc., 1999 WL 
33244779 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), in which the Utah Court of Appeals determined that the 
purchaser of a business could not, as a matter of law, rely on statements made by a 
broker in the . face of an identical non-reliance clause. Thus, based on the logic and 
reasoning of Ruf, plaintiffs' ~laims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation fail as a 
~ matter of law. Coldwell's motion on these claims is granted and they are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. Neither the Ruf. case nor the other cases dealing with the 
reliance issue involve claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The court is not persuaded at 
this point that a non-reliance clause operates in the same fashion in this context. For 
that reason, the court declines at this point to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
Caldwell's motion on this claim is therefore denied. 
This minute entry is the order of the court, and no additional order is required to 
be prepared. 
DATED this 31 st day of October, 2012. 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 110916924 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: 
84121 
MAIL: 
MAIL: 
CITY 
Date: 
J SPENCER BALL 3690 EFT UNION BLVD #101 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
SHANE W NORRIS 9350 S 150 E STE 500 SANDY UT 84070 
TRACY A WILDER 999 E MURRAY-HOLLADAY RD STE 200 SALT LAKE 
UT 84117 
10/31/2012 /s/ AMANDA OLS~ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Printed: 10/31/12 16:01:19 Page 1 (last) 
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Shane W. Norris, #8097 
@ Law Division of NRT, LLC 
7730 S. Union Park Ave., Ste. 675 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 563-7606 
Facsimile: (801) 563-7607 
@ Attorney for Coldwell Banker 
Commercial, NRT and Duane Bush 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
REPEREX, INC, a Utah Corporation, 
BRAD BALL, and DAVID BALL, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
CHILD, VAN WAGONER, BRADSHAW, 
;.;j PLLC, a Utah Professional Limited 
Liability Corporation, J. RUSSTON 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS COLDWELL 
BANKER COMMERCIAL AND DUANE 
BUSH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
BRADSHAW, COLDWELL BANKER Civil No. 110916924 
COMMERCIAL, and DUANE BUSH, 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Defendants. 
On or about January 17, 2014, Defendants, Coldwell Banker Commercial and 
Duane Bush (hereafter collectively AColdwell Banker@) moved for summary judgment 
against Plaintiffs Reperex, Inc., Brad Ball and David Ball (hereafter collectively 
APlaintiffs@). Coldwell Banker=s Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Parties= respective briefing on Coldwell Banker=s Motion for Summary Judgment 
~ April 21, 2014 03:11 PM 58 
was completed on or about February 12, 2014. A hearing was held before this Court on 
March 19, 2014. At the hearing the Court entered its Ruling on Coldwell Banker's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
After having fully analyzed the pleadings on file and after having received oral 
argument on the matter, the Court finds and holds as follows: 
1. 
2. 
April 21, 2014 03:11 PM 
The Court is of the opinion that under Utah law, expert 
testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care 
owed by a particular profession where the duties of the 
particular profession are not within the common knowledge 
and experience of the average person. 
It is not within the knowledge of the average person what 
particular duties and responsibilities a business broker would 
owe in connection with analyzing or transmitting information 
to a prospective buyer. Nor is -it within the common 
knowledge of the average person as to the extent to which a 
broker would be obligated to potentially employ leagues of 
experts in various disciplines to be able to analyze the data 
and information, such as financial records, that is provided to 
the business broker in order to understand the information 
and be able to know whether there is a duty to relay the 
information to a party in the transaction. Therefore expert 
2 
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3. 
4. 
testimony is required to establish said duties in this matter. 
Plaintiffs failed to name an expert witness to establish the 
duties of business brokerage Coldwell Banker Commercial 
and business broker Duane Bush. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court holds that the 
Plaintiffs must have expert testimony to establish the 
standard of care to be applied to Coldwell Banker under the 
facts of the case and to assist a jury in determining whether 
Coldwell Banker's conduct satisfied the applicable standard. 
and therefore Plaintiffs' sole remaining cause of action for 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty fails as a matter of law. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Coldwell Banker's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and 
Plaintiffs remaining cause of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty is 
dismissed. 
DATED this_ day of ______ , 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Todd Shaughnessy 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
3 
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By: /s/ J. Spencer Ball 
J. Spencer Ball, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By: /s/ Tyler S. Foutz 
Tyler S. Foutz, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Child, Van Wagoner 
& Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw 
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[Electronic signatures affixed with permission of counsel.] COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS= COLDWELL BANKER COMMERCIAL 
AND DUANE BUSH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served upon the 
following via ECF: 
J. Spencer Ball 
Attorney at Law 
3690 E. Ft. Union Blvd. #101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
spencer@spenberball.com 
Tyler S. Foutz 
OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC 
999 E Murray Holladay Rd #200 
Salt Lake City UT 84117 
tyler@osnlaw.com 
Shane W. Norris 
Law Division of NRT, LLC 
9350 South 150 East, #500 
Sandy, UT 84070 
shane. norris@utahhomes.com 
@ April 21, 2014 03:11 PM 
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Tyler S. Foutz, #10855 
OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC 
999 East Murray-Holladay Road, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 365-1030 
Facsimile: (801) 365-1031 
Email: tyler@osnlaw.com 
The Order of Court is stated below: 
Dated: April 21, 2014 
03:15:09 PM 
Attorney for Child, Van Wagoner & Bradshaw, PLLC, 
and J. Russton Bradshaw 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPEREX, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
BRAD HALL, and DAVID BALL 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
CHILD VAN WAGONER & BRADSHAW, 
PLLC, a Utah Professional Limited 
Liability Company, J. RUSSTON 
BRADSHAW, COLDWELL BANKER 
COMMERCIAL, and DUANE BUSH, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT CHILD VAN 
WAGONER & BRADSHAW AND 
J. RUSSTON BRADSHAW'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 110916924 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
On March 19, 2014, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Child Van Wagoner 
& Bradshaw and J. Russton Bradshaw (hereinafter "Defendants") came before the court on 
oral argument, with Defendants represented by their counsel of record, Tyler S. Foutz, and 
Plaintiffs represented by their counsel of record, Spencer Ball. Based on the parties' 
April 21, 2014 03:15 PM 63 
briefing and oral arguments submitted, and good cause appearing therefore, the court 
issued a verbal ruling at the conclusion of the hearing, and now hereby finds and orders as 
follows: 
1. The Court finds that there are disputed facts with regard to Plaintiffs' Count I - Fraud. 
The parties' conduct and knowledge at the time of the August 11, 2008 is factually 
disputed. 
2. The Court finds It is undisputed that Defendants and Plaintiffs were not in privity of 
contract for the purpose of Defendants providing accounting services to Plaintiffs. 
3. The Court finds It is undisputed that there is no writing from Defendants to either Mays, 
Vi Mays Custom Tile, or Plaintiffs in which it was asserted by Defendants that Plaintiffs were 
entitled to rely on the ac~ounting services and information provided by Defendants to Mays 
and Mays Custom Tile. 
4. The Court finds that Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602 is applicable to this case. 
5. The Court finds that pursuant to the operation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602, 
Defendants cannot be liable to Plaintiffs for claims other than fraud or intentional 
_j misrepresentation due to: 
a. the lack of privity between Plaintiffs and Defendants; and 
b. the lack of a writing issued by Defendants which satisfies the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-26a-602(2)(b). 
Based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby Orders as follows: 
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ORDER 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied with respect to Plaintiffs' Count I 
(Fraud against Defendants). 
2. Plaintiffs Count II (Negligent Fraud against Defendants) is dismissed. 
3. Plaintiffs' Count Ill (Breach of Duty against Defendants) is dismissed. 
** END OF DOCUMENT** 
* COURT SEAL LOCATED AT TOP OF DOCUMENT* 
Approved as to form: 
/s/ J. Spencer Ball 
J. Spencer Ball, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/s/ Shane W. Norris 
Shane W. Norris, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Coldwell Banker Commercial, 
NRT, and Duane Bush 
[Electronic signatures affixed on authorization by Mr. Ball and Mr. Norris] 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18 TH day of April, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT CHILD VAN WAGONER & BRADSHAW AND 
J. RUSSTON BRADSHAW'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by the 
method indicated below to the following: 
J. Spencer Ball 
3690 East Fort Union Blvd., #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
April 21, 2014 03:15 PM 
( x ) Electronic Filing Notification 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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Shane W. Norris 
Law Division of NRT, LLC 
9350 South 150 East, #550 
Sandy, Utah 85070 
Richard J. Armstrong 
Brinton M. Wilkins 
KIRTON MCCONKIE 
50 E. South Temple 
PO Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
rarmstrong@kmclaw.com 
By: /s/ Dusty France 
.1 April 21, 2014 03:15 PM 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
( x ) Electronic Filing Notification 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
( x ) Electronic Filing Notification 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Overnight Mail 
() Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on August 24, 2015, I served by planing in the mail, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, to the following: 
Shane W. Norris 
Law Division of NRT, LLC 
7730 S. Union Park Ave., Ste. 675 
Midvale UT 84047 
Tyler S. Foutz 
Olsen Skoubye & Nielson, LLC 
999 E. Murray Holladay Road # 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Isl Spencer Ball -- ___ ..,..__ _ 
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